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ABSTRACT
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internalcontrols on government would be
necessary. Inframing a government which is to be administeredby men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you mustfirst enable the government to
1
control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 1
For many Americans, the rise of the administrativestate signaled the
deteriorationof theframers' visionfor American government. Gone are the
days where the Legislative Branch primarily enacted laws, the Executive
Branch enforced laws, and the Judicial Branch interpreted laws and
adjudicated disputes. Today, the American form of government is an
administrative state. Agencies possess legislative, executive, andjudicial
government
powers and wield those powers to administer critical
2
programs-often at the directive of the Executive Branch.
Scholars have repeatedly criticized the evolution of the administrative
state as unlawful, unconstitutional,and have even gone so far as to call it a
"bloodless constitutionalrevolution. "' But who is to blame for the creation
of the administrative state? Does the blame fall on Franklin Roosevelt's
New Deal? There is no doubt that the "growth of the administrativestate
can be traced,for the mostpart,to the New Deal, "butperhaps the New Deal
"merely served as the occasion for implementing the ideas of America's
Progressives. 4
This Comment argues that Congress has primarilycontributedto the
growth and empowerment of the administrative state. Not merely through
the traditionalprocess of creating administrative agencies, but through
Congress's abdicationof its legislativepower to the President,who in turn
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
2. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP:
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 8 (2017).

PRIVATIZATION'S THREAT TO THE

3. Gary Lawson, The Rise andRiseof the AdministrativeState, 107 HARV. L. REv. 123 1,
1231 (1994).
4. Ronald Pestritto, The Birth of the Administrative State: Where It Came From and
What It Means for Limited Government, HERITAGE FOUND. 1 (Nov. 20, 2007),
https://perma.cc/VRG4-TFFP.
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utilizes the administrativeagencies as tools to do his bidding. This Comment
further argues that once Congress has delegatedits legislativepower to the
President,and the President has empowered the administrative state, the
JudicialBranchgenerally defers to both the Presidentandthe administrative
state. This has emboldened the administrative state and enabled it to
flourish.
This Comment begins with a brief introduction of the historical
principles underlying the American form of government and how, against
the backdrop of the framers' intent, the administrative state undermines
these principles. Part I discusses a broad overview of the current
administrativestate. It specifically considers what roles Congress and the
President have traditionallyplayed in the administrative state. Part II
discusses Trump v. Hawaii and the Trade Expansion Act. Both illustrate
Congress 's abdicationof its legislativepower and the President'suse ofthat
authority to empower the administrativestate to act. PartIII of the Comment
discusses the two ways in which thejudiciary branch acquiesces to actions
taken by both the Presidentand administrativeagencies.

IN TRODUCTION .................................................................................
560
I. THE UNACCOUNTABLE "FOURTH BRANCH" OF GOVERNMENT .... 562
II. TRUMP V. HA WAH AND THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT'S ROLE IN
FORTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE ............................ 565

A . Trump v. Haw aii ...............................................................
1. President Trump's Use of Congress's Authority ........
2. President Trump's Empowerment of Administrative
A gen cies ...................................................................
B. The Trade Expansion Act ..................................................

565
565
570
572

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: UNDERSTANDING TRUMP v. HA WAH AGAINST
THE BACKDROP OF YOUNGSTOWN AND CHEVRON .................. 574

A. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co .........................................
575
B. Judiciary's Deference to Administrative Agencies: Chevron
*0o .0oooo
.................
..........
............
. ....
..............
5 78
CON CLU SIO N .....................................................................................

580

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long critiqued the administrative state for its smudgingor eviscerating-of the lines delineated by the separation of powers
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doctrine.5 "The framers of the Constitution aimed to create a national
government that was energetic, but limited, effective, yet safe .... Their
6
This balanced
goal, in short, was to produce balanced government."
as seen in the
power,
tyrannical
of
fear
framers'
the
by
fueled
approach was
7
English government and fought against during the American Revolution.
To achieve a balanced government and prevent tyranny, the framers
separated government power between three federal branches of government
8
with the intent that no one branch could accumulate vast power. James
Madison made it clear in Federalist No. 47:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
would be necessary
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
9
system.
the
of
reprobation
universal
a
to inspire
James Madison elaborated in Federalist No. 51:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others ....Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
10
should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
By design, each branch was vested with specific powers that the other
branches were not. Congress, "the most representative, and thus the most
1
The
democratic of the three branches," received lawmaking power.
Executive Branch, headed by the President, was vested with executive power
that required the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.12 The Judicial Branch was vested with judicial power to
adjudicate cases and controversies.13
The Framers did not merely divide power among the three federal
branches. "The president, [Congress], and federal judges were each made
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

Id. at 3-5.
KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 11 (3d ed. 2019).

Id.
Pestritto, supra note 4, at 3-4.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
WERHAN, supra note 6, at 41.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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answerable to different constituencies and subject to different temporal and
occupational demands. These differences ensured that the branches would
regularly clash. And such clashing was good.., for the prevention of
tyranny and for the.., promotion of liberty." 14
In contrast to the framers' design, the current administrative state grants
all three powers-legislative, executive, and judicial-to administrative
agencies and makes those agencies answerable to only the President.
"Agencies typically have authority to make legally binding rules (which
resembles the legislative power of Congress), to enforce statues and
administer programs (which is executive in nature), and to adjudicate
disputes (which resembles the judicial power of the federal courts)."' 5 This
conglomeration of powers and lack of accountability is at odds with the
framers' carefully crafted branches of government. Many complain that
administrative agencies "embody the evil of tyranny that separation of
powers was designed to avoid."' 6 The framers' intended clashing does not
occur when all three powers accumulate in one agency.
Thus, the question remains, who or what can be blamed for the
deviation from the framers' intent to create a balanced government to the
current administrative state? This Comment seeks to answer that question.
It proposes that Congress is mainly responsible for the creation, growth, and
continued empowerment of the administrative state.
I. THE UNACCOUNTABLE "FOURTH BRANCH" OF GOVERNMENT
The American administrative state is made up of hundreds of
agencies. 17 The term administrative agency is often broadly defined as "any
government entity with the authority to take actions that alter the legal rights
and obligations of individuals."' 8 This definition does little for the average
American citizen, who is more likely to recognize the names of specific
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Fair
Housing Administration (FHA), or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).

14. MICHAELS, supranote 2, at 7.
15. WERHAN, supra note 6, at 48.
16. Id.
17. There is a good deal of confusion on the exact number of federal administrative
agencies and there appears to be no authoritative list of all government agencies. See Clyde
Wayne Crews, Nobody Knows How Many FederalAgencies Exist, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/WE6L-WJS3; see also Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How
Many FederalAgencies Exist? We Can'tDrain the Swamp Until We Know, FoRBES (July 5,
2017, 4:03 PM), https://perma.cc/Q5C3-K35T.
18. WERHAN, supra note 6, at 3.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol41/iss2/7

4

Martin: The Administrative State: Congress's Role in Perpetuating It

2019]

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Congress is responsible for the creation and initial empowerment of
administrative agencies.' 9 Congress creates an agency through the passage
of legislation termed an "enabling act."'2' This act specifies the provisions
that empower, as well as limit, the agency's power.2 1 "[E]nabling acts
•.. operate as a kind of corporate charter for the agency."22 The provisions
in the enabling acts are binding on the agency. 23 "Any agency action that
exceeds the authority that Congress has provided it, or that is inconsistent
with any provision in the enabling act, is ultra vires... and thus invalid."2 4
When creating an agency, Congress "possesses broad authority" to
design it in a manner that is conducive to fulfilling a prescribed mission.25
While an agency's mission can vary significantly depending on Congress's
intent, agencies generally address pragmatic issues such as managing crises,
redressing serious social problems, or overseeing complex matters of
governmental concern that are beyond the expertise of legislators.2 6
Administrative agencies are responsible for administering numerous
government programs dealing with countless matters, including healthcare,
tax credits, housing loans, education loans, clean air, and safe food.
Given Congress's expansive authority to create agencies in the way it
pleases, agencies come in all shapes and sizes. "While all administrative
agencies share in common the power to take legally binding actions, they
otherwise exhibit a wide variety of form and function."27 Congress designs
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id. "Administrative lawyers refer to these statutes as 'organic' or 'enabling' acts,
sometimes interchangeably." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Administrative Agency: History of Administrative Agency, Federal Administrative
Agencies, State and Local Administrative Agencies, Further Readings, JRANK,
https://perma.cc/J286-VQMP (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). There are three primary theories
concerning what motivates agency action. WERHAN, supra note 6, at 6. First, the public
interest theory which "posits that agencies act in order to further public values and the general
good, as either the legislature or agency officials have defined them. According to this view,
Congress creates agencies as a means of addressing public problems that existing
institutions... have been unable to resolve." Id. Second, the interest group theory views
agency decisions as a trade-off for preferential treatment pressed on the agency by interest
groups. Id. at 7. "According to interest group theory, the decision-making process of agency
does not provide a forum for public deliberation, but rather a field of competition among
interested parties." Id. Third, the public choice theory uses an "economic model to explain
public policymaking. According to public choice theory, agency action is a 'good' that is
distributed in a regulatory 'market' according to the laws of supply and demand." Id.
27. Id. at 5.
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agencies in two basic forms. First, Congress can create executive agencies
which "are designed to be responsive to the political and policy direction of
the president." 28 Second, Congress can create independent agencies which
"are somewhat insulated from presidential control."2 9 "Independent
agencies generally are led by a collegial group of individuals... whose
membership is closely balanced between the two major political parties."3
Depending on the authority given to the agency by Congress, a single
agency may possess power comparable to that of all three traditional
branches of government. 3 It is common for a single agency to have the
power to create a rule through rulemaking, a process akin to legislative
lawmaking, as well as the power to issue an order through adjudication, a
process akin to a judicial trial.32 This consolidation of legislative, judicial,
and executive power in a single agency is often at the forefront of criticisms
of the administrative state.33
Traditionally, the President's primary domestic function is to enforce
acts of Congress as evidenced by the "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed ' 34 clause in Article II of the Constitution. 35 Due to the endless
number of laws, it is impossible for the President to personally oversee their
execution. To remedy this, Congress vests "authority to administer statutory
programs in a federal agency.., rather than in the president. In the
administrative state, agency officials, not the [P]resident, primarily exercise
the executive power. ' 36 By and large, the President fulfills his constitutional
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" 37 in a managerial
sense "by overseeing how administrative agencies carry out their statutory
authority." 38
Clearly, Congress plays a vital role in the creation of administrative
agencies. However, creating agencies is not the only role Congress plays in
perpetuating the growth of the administrative state. Congress also bolsters
the administrative state through abdication of its legislative power to the
President who uses the administrative agencies to do his bidding. This

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at48.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST.art. II, § 3.
WERHAN, supra note 6, at 81.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
WERHAN, supra note 6, at 81.
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exchange can be seen through an examination of Trump v. Hawaii and the
Trade Expansion Act.
I. TRUMP V. HA WAII AND THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT'S ROLE IN
FORTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

This part will discuss two illustrations where Congress abdicated its
legislative power to the President, who in turn empowered the administrative
state to act on the President's behalf. First, in Trump v. Hawaii, President
Trump utilized power delegated to him by Congress under the Immigration
and Nationality Act to empower administrative agencies to make findings of
39
facts regarding entry of foreign nationals into the United States. Second,
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, President Trump directed
administrative agencies to investigate and report on the effects of imports of
steel mill articles on national security.40
A. Trump v. Hawaii
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court held that a presidential
proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nations from eight
countries was a valid exercise of presidential authority under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.4 1 Trump v. Hawaii is an ideal illustration
of the main principal of this Comment. It shows Congress's explicit
delegation of legislative authority to the President via statute and the
President's use of that authority to empower the administrative state to act
under his direction.
1. President Trump's Use of Congress'sAuthority
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act on June 27,
1952.42 Under the Act, "foreign nationals seeking entry into the United
States undergo a vetting process to ensure that they satisfy the numerous
requirements for admission [to the United States]." 43 The Act "establishes
numerous grounds on which an alien abroad may be inadmissible to the

39. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403, 2407-09 (2018).
40. Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11619 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation No. 9705,
83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018); PresidentialProclamationon Adjusting Imports ofSteel
into the United States, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/V6VL-XD2K.
41. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2399-416.
42. 8 U.S.C §§ 1101-1537 (2012).
43. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403.
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United States and ineligible for a visa."'
The President was vested with
authority to restrict the entry of aliens when he finds that their entry "would
45
be detrimental to the interests of the United States.
Relying on Congress's delegation of power, President Trump signed
Executive Order No. 13769 (EO-l) on January 27, 2017.46 "EO-l directed
the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a review to examine the
adequacy of information provided by foreign governments about their
nationals seeking to enter the United States. 4 7 While that review occurred,
the order suspended the entry of foreign nationals from "Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen" for ninety days. 48 These seven countries
had previously been "identified by Congress or prior administrations as
posing heightened terrorism risks."' 4 9 EO-1 was immediately challenged,
and the United States "District Court for the Western District of Washington
entered a temporary restraining order blocking the entry restrictions." 5 On
appeal, the United States "Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the
51
Government's request to stay that order.
In response to the litigation, President Trump revoked EO-1 and
replaced it with Executive Order No. 13780 (EO-2). 52 EO-2 still directed a
worldwide review but cited "investigative burdens on agencies and the need
to diminish the risk that dangerous individuals would enter [the United
States] without adequate vetting. ' ' 53 Likewise, EO-2 restricted the entry of
foreign nationals for ninety days, but limited its reach to six of the seven
countries listed in EO-1, excluding Iraq.5 4 Those six countries had been
chosen because each "is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly
44. Id. at 2407 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(3)(C) (2012)).
45. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 2403; see also Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
47. Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2403 (discussing Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8977).
The Department of Homeland Security is a relatively new Cabinet-level department. It was
created as a response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as a means to safeguard the
United States against terrorism and respond to any further attacks. The Department began its
efforts to minimize threat even days after the terrorist attacks; however, Congress did not
actually pass the Homeland Security Act until November 2002. Creationof the Department
of Homeland Security, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://perma.cc/3HL2-5RAZ.
48. Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2403.
49. Id.(discussing Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8978).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2403-04 (discussing Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9,
2017)).
53. Id. at 2404 (discussing Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213).
54. Id.
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55
compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones."
However, EO-2 allowed for case-by-case-waivers of foreign nationals from
the listed countries, whereas EO-1 did not.56 Unsurprisingly, EO-2 was
promptly challenged in federal district court. 5 7 Soon after, the "District
Courts for the Districts of Maryland and Hawaii entered nationwide
preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of [EO-2], and the respective
Courts of Appeals upheld those injunctions." 58
Then, after the worldwide review, President Trump issued
"The
Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017.59
identifying
by
procedures
vetting
improve
to
sought
Proclamation...
ongoing deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nationals
of particular countries present 'public safety threats."' 6° To support this
stated purpose, the Proclamation restricted entry of nationals from eight
countries--Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and
Yemen-"whose systems for managing and sharing information about their
nationals [President Trump] deemed inadequate. 61

55. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13210).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Supreme Court "granted certiorari and stayed the injunctions-allowing the
entry suspension to go into effect-with respect to foreign nationals who lacked a 'credible
claim of a bona fide relationship' with a person or entity in the United States. The temporary
restrictions in EO-2 expired before [the Supreme Court] took any action, and [the Court]
vacated the lower court decisions as moot." Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. (citing Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45162 (Sept. 24, 2017)).
60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id.; Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45162. The Supreme Court described
the Proclamation as follows:
The Proclamation described how foreign states were selected for inclusion based
on the review undertaken pursuant to EO-2. As part of that review, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and several
intelligence agencies, developed a 'baseline' for the information required from
foreign governments to confirm the identity of individuals seeking entry into the
United States, and to determine whether those individuals pose a security threat.
The baseline included three components. The first, 'identity-management
information,' focused on whether a foreign government ensures the integrity of
travel documents by issuing electronic passports, reporting lost or stolen passports,
and making available additional identity-related information. Second, the agencies
considered the extent to which the country discloses information on criminal history
and suspected terrorist links, provides travel document exemplars, and facilitates
the U. S. Government's receipt of information about airline passengers and crews
traveling to the United States. Finally, the agencies weighed various indicators of
national security risk, including whether the foreign state is a known or
potential terrorist safe haven and whether it regularly declines to receive returning
nationals following final orders of removal from the United States.
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The State of Hawaii, Dr. Ismail Elshikh, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, and
the Muslim Association of Hawaii sued President Trump challenging the
62
Proclamation in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.
Plaintiffs argued that the Proclamation was not a valid exercise of President
Trump's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).63
Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that the INA confers "only a residual power
to temporarily halt the entry of a discrete group of aliens engaged in harmful
conduct."' Plaintiffs further contended that the Proclamation was in conflict
with another provision in the INA6 5 because the Proclamation discriminated
against an individual based on an individual's nationality. 6 "Under the
[INA], foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States undergo a
vetting process to ensure that they satisfy the numerous requirements for
admission."67 The Act "establishes numerous grounds on which an alien
abroad may be inadmissible to the United States and ineligible for a visa." 68

DHS collected and evaluated data regarding all foreign governments. It
identified 16 countries as having deficient information-sharing practices and
presenting national security concerns, and another 31 countries as 'at risk' of
similarly failing to meet the baseline. The State Department then undertook
diplomatic efforts over a 50-day period to encourage all foreign governments to
improve their practices. As a result of that effort, numerous countries provided
DHS with travel document exemplars and agreed to share information on known or
suspected terrorists.
Following the 50-day period, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
concluded that eight countries-Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria,
Venezuela, and Yemen-remained deficient in terms of their risk profile and
willingness to provide requested information. The Acting Secretary recommended
that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from all of those
countries except Iraq.
Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2404-05 (internal citations omitted).
62. Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2406. The Court also noted:
The State [of Hawaii] operates the University of Hawaii system, which recruits
students and faculty from the designated countries. The three individual plaintiffs are
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents who have relatives from Iran, Syria, and
Yemen applying for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas. The Association is a nonprofit
organization that operates a mosque in Hawaii.
Plaintiffs challenged the
Proclamation-except as applied to North Korea and Venezuela ....
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id at 2408.
65. 8 U.S.C § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
66. Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2408.
67. Id.at 2403.
68. Id. at 2407.
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"The District Court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the entry restrictions." 69 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed and held that the Proclamation exceeded the President's
authority under the INA.70 The Supreme Court's analysis centered on the
text of the INA and the expansive power Congress granted the President
through the statute. 71 Through the INA, Congress gave the President
expansive discretion regarding immigration policy and enforcement. The
Court stated that the plain language of the INA "grants the President broad
72
discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States." The text
of the INA emanates "deference to the President in every clause" of the
statute. 73 Congress, through the INA, "entrust[ed] to the President the
decisions whether and when to suspend entry... for how long [to suspend
entry] .. . and on what conditions [to suspend entry into the United
States]. 74
The Court explained that the Proclamation landed well within
75
The sole
Congress's comprehensive delegation to the President.
prerequisite in the text of the INA is that the President make a finding of fact
"that the entry of the covered aliens 'would be detrimental to the interests of
President Trump satisfied Congress's lone
the United States.' ' 76
prerequisite by empowering and utilizing the administrative state through
administrative agencies. He utilized administrative agencies, such as the
Department of Homeland Security, to conduct a comprehensive evaluation
of all countries' compliance with the information and risk assessment
baseline.77
The Court went on to say that "[t]he President lawfully exercised that
discretion based on [the President's] findings-following a worldwide,
multi-agency review-that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental
to the national interest."7 8 It explained that "plaintiffs' attempts to identify
a conflict with other provisions in the INA, and their appeal to the statute's

69. Id. at 2406.
70. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provision of the
INA in question only "authorize[d] only a 'temporary' suspension of entry in response to
'exigencies' that 'Congress would be ill-equipped to address."' Id. (quoting Hawaiiv. Trump,

878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 2407-08.
Id. at 2408.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)).

77. See id.
78. Id.
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purposes and legislative history, fail to overcome the clear statutory
79
language.1
The Court ultimately determined that the "Proclamation [was] squarely
within the scope of Presidential authority under the INA."8 The Court's
lengthy discussion and narrow analysis of the text of the INA make it
apparent that the sole reason the President had the power to make the
Proclamation was because in passing the INA, Congress granted expansive
discretion to the President to make findings of fact.
2. PresidentTrump's Empowerment ofAdministrativeAgencies
To exercise the authority Congress granted to the President under the
INA, and thus restrict the entry of aliens, President Trump had to make
findings of fact as to what would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States."
To make the findings of fact, President Trump used the
administrative state by empowering various administrative agencies to make
his findings of fact for him.82 To do so, the President directed the agencies
to conduct "a worldwide review of whether, and if so what, additional
information would be needed from each foreign country to assess adequately
whether their nationals seeking to enter the United States pose a security or
safety threat.," 3
Specifically, in EO-1, President Trump directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit to him a list of countries recommended for
inclusion in the Proclamation.84 The list "would prohibit the entry of
appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not
provided the information requested until they do so or until the Secretary of
Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so,
or has adequately shared information through other means."85 "As part of
the review, the Secretary of Homeland Security established global
requirements for information sharing in support of immigration screening
and vetting.
The Secretary of Homeland Security developed a
comprehensive set of criteria and applied it to the information-sharing
practices, policies, and capabilities of foreign governments." 8 6 Thereafter,

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at2415.
Id.
Both the President and administrative agencies are within the Executive Branch.
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
Id. at 45163.
Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017)).
Id at45161.
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the Secretary of State engaged with the countries in an effort to address
deficiencies and achieve improvements. 87
The President further delegated the power given to him from Congress
under the INA to the Secretary of Homeland Security.8 8 The Secretary was
tasked with determining what countries remained deficient with respect to
their identity-management and information-sharing capabilities.8 9 Some of
these countries also had a "significant terrorist presence within their
territory." 90 President Trump then adopted that determination, which
ultimately resulted in his finding that "absent the measures set forth in this
proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States
of persons described in section 2 of this proclamation would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to
certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions." 9 1 President Trump wholly
relied on Homeland Security's determination that Chad, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen continued to have inadequate identitymanagement protocols to the extent that entry restrictions and limitations
were set in place.92
Trump v. Hawaii illustrates the crux of the argument of this Comment.
Congress creates and empowers administrative agencies through enabling
statutes, and feeds administrative agencies by deferring to the President.
Congress bolsters and grows the administrative state through its abdication
of legislative power to the President who, in turn, utilizes the administrative
agencies as tools to accomplish his mission. One need look no further than
Congress's passage of the INA, which delegated the President the authority
to make a finding of fact on immigration. The President used that authority
to empower administrative agencies to investigate and act, which lead to the
administrative agencies making findings of fact for the President.
Congress's deference to the President has led to further destruction of
the separation of powers doctrine. Instead of the branches of government
clashing as the framers' intended, Congress's willingness to relinquish its
legislative power to the President has created a monopoly of federal power
in the administrative state. This "gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department" is exactly what James Madison, the Constitution's
leading architect, warned about in Federalist No. 5 1.9" "The accumulation
87. Id.
88. The Secretary of Homeland Security consulted with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at45161-62.
92. Id. at45164.
93. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. ' 94 Trump
v. Hawaii is not the only recent example of this. The Trade Expansion Act
is yet another example of Congress's delegation of power to the President
which results in the manipulation of the administrative state.
B. The Trade Expansion Act
Despite Article I of the United States Constitution vesting Congress
with the power to regulate international trade, 95 Congress explicitly
delegated trade policy authority to the President in the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962.96 The stated purposes of this Act were threefold. First, the Act was
passed "to stimulate the economic growth of the United states and maintain
and enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture,
industry, mining, and commerce."9 7 Second, the Act was supposed to
"strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the
development of open and nondiscriminatory trading." 98 Third, the Act was
supposed "to prevent Communist economic penetration." 99
In its unamended form, the Act gave the President broad discretion to
make a finding of fact-to determine whether any existing duties or import
restrictions were unduly burdensome on foreign trade.100 Once the President
made that finding, Congress gave him the authority to enter into trade

94. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. "Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the 'Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,' and 'To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States."' Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, Presidential
Authority over Trade: Imposing Tariffs and Duties, CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/DGB2-8BQ3 (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
96. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)) [hereinafter Trade Expansion Act].
97. Id. § 102.
98. Id."The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was widely regarded as the most important
legislation passed by the 87th Congress. It was also President Kennedy's largest and most
satisfying legislative victory in his first two years in office. The new Act gave the President
more tariff-cutting authority than had ever been granted by Congress to a President. It
embodied new trade policy concepts and was designed to match the architecture of new world
trade patterns." The Trade Expansion Act, CQ ALMANAC (1962) https://perma.cc/D2UTN2PQ.
99. Trade Expansion Act § 102.
100. Trade Expansion Act § 201(a).
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agreements, adopt import restrictions, proclaim modifications of any
existing duty, and a number of other options.' 0 '
The Act has been amended various times since 1962. In its current
state, the Act relies on administrative agencies to work in conjunction with,
and for, the President. 10 2 The Act states that if the Secretary of Commerce
"finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security," then the President is authorized by Congress to take such other
acts as the President deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so
0 3 This
that such imports "will not threaten to impair the national security."'
is quintessentially Congress delegating broad authority to the President.
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued a Proclamation entitled
"Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States.""' This Proclamation
stated that the Secretary of Commerce investigated and submitted a report to
President Trump on the "effect of imports of steel mill articles ... on the
national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962."' l°S The Proclamation detailed the Commerce
Secretary's findings including the Secretary's opinion that steel articles were
"being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United
States."'0 6 The Proclamation stated that the Secretary determined that the
"present quantities of steel articles imports and the circumstances of global
excess capacity for producing steel are 'weakening our internal economy,'
resulting in the persistent threat of further closures of domestic steel
production facilities and the 'shrinking ability to meet national security
production requirements in a national emergency.'"107
Based on the Secretary's recommendations, and in accordance with
Congress's explicit delegation of power under the Trade Expansion Act,
President Trump "decided to adjust the imports of steel articles by imposing
a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on steel articles .... " 8 President Trump's

101. Id. The Act also gave the President authority to continue existing duty-free or excise
treatment. § 201(a)(2).
102. § 222.
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A), (c)(1)(A)(ii).
104. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 11626. The proclamation also cited Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended (19 U.S.C. § 2483) which "authorize[d] the President to embody in the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of acts affecting import
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Proclamation thereafter explicitly empowered various administrative
agencies to execute duties in relation to the Proclamation. 0 9 The President
specifically empowered the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense,
the United States Trade Representative, and a number of other agencies, to
"provide relief from the additional duties set forth... in this proclamation
for any steel article determined not to be produced in the United States."' 10
The power to make the finding of fact regarding whether a steel article
should be excluded from the duties in the Proclamation was delegated to the
Secretary of Commerce. 11 ' The President also empowered the agencies
listed above to "continue to monitor imports of steel articles" and "review
2
the status of such imports with respect to the national security." "1
The Trade Expansion Act is yet another example of Congress explicitly
delegating its authority to the President. The President used this delegation
to impose a twenty-five percent ad valorem tax and empower the
administrative state to investigate and monitor the situation as well as make
additional findings of fact regarding whether a steel article should be
excluded from the proclamation." 3 Congress's abdication of its legislative
power to the President undermines the separation of powers doctrine that our
nation was founded upon. That issue is compounded by deference given to
the President and administrative agencies by the Judicial Branch.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: UNDERSTANDING TRUMP V. HA WAII AGAINST THE
BACKDROP OF YOUNGSTOWN AND CHEVRON

As is apparent from Trump v. Hawaii, the Court relied on Congress's
explicit grant of power to the President to make findings of fact. 4 This led
the Court to the determination that the "Proclamation [was] squarely within
the scope of Presidential authority under the INA.""' 5 Such an outcome is
not surprising when viewed against the backdrop of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., arguably the most influential opinion regarding presidential
power.

treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or
imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction." Id.
109. Id.at 11627.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.at 11628.
Id.at 11626.
See generally Trump v.Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
Id.at2415.
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A. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
In 1951, during the height of the Korean War, a dispute arose between
various steel companies, including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company,
and their employees surrounding the possible terms of new collective
bargaining agreements.I 6 After failed resolutions, the United Steelworkers
of America notified the steel companies of its intention to strike as soon as
the bargaining agreement expired." 7 In an attempt to avoid the strike,
President Truman "referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization
Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms
of settlement." ' 118 When no settlement was reached, "the Union gave notice
"The
of a nation-wide strike" set to begin on April 9, 1952.119
indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and
other war materials led [ ] President [Truman] to believe that the proposed
" 120
work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense ....
With these considerations in mind, President Truman issued Executive Order
10340.121 Pursuant to this order, Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer,
122
took possession of the steel mills to ensure their continued operation.
Even though President Truman sent two messages to Congress shortly after
issuing the executive order, Congress took no action in response to the
seizure. 121
The steel companies sued the Secretary arguing that the seizures were
"not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions." 124
The companies asked the district court to "declare the orders of the President
and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions
restraining their enforcement."' 125 The United States argued that "a strike
disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the
well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had 'inherent
power' ... 'supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
117. Id. The existing bargaining agreement was set to expire on December 31, 1951. Id.
118. Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at583.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. To do so, the Secretary of Commerce issued his own orders requiring the
presidents of seized steel companies to serve as operating managers. Id. The presidents "were
directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the
Secretary." Id.
123. Id. The Solicitor General acknowledged that Congress never authorized the seizure.
Id. at 648.
124. Id. at 583.
125. Id.
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court decisions."' 1 26 A preliminary injunction issued by the trial court
temporarily precluded the Secretary from seizing the steel plants and from
12 7
acting under the executive order's "purported authority".
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the interest of having these
issues promptly decided.128 The Court defined the key issue as whether the
seizure was within the "constitutional power of the President." 12 9 In a sixto-three decision the majority declared the seizure of the steel mills
unconstitutional.13
The Court started its analysis by stating that the
President's power "must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."' 3' It then summarily determined that there was no act
from Congress. 3 2 The Court further held that the President's military power
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to the taking of
private property "in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
1' 33
production."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. has become "[t]he leading case
addressing the scope of inherent presidential power-the ability of the
president to act without express constitutional or statutory authority."' 3 4
Although Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, seven different opinions
were written because the Justices in the majority disagreed on when the
President may act without express constitutional or statutory authority. 35
Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion is arguably the most
influential opinion regarding presidential power because he identified three
zones of presidential authority. 136 First, he identified zone one: "When the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate."' 137 Justice Jackson
emphasized that the level of power the President would have if acting in zone

126. Id. at 584.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 588.
131. Id.at 585.
132. Id. Although there were two statutes that authorized the President to take both
personal property and real property, the Government admitted that the conditions of these
statutes were not met and the executive order was not rooted in either statute. Id. at 585-86.
133. Id. at 587.
134. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 352 (5th ed.
2011).
135. Id. at 353.
136. Id. at 355.
137. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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one by stating, "In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
If his act is held
said.. . to personify the federal sovereignty.
that the Federal
means
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually
13 8
power."
lacks
whole
undivided
an
as
Government
The second zone is "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
139
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain."
Finally, the third zone is "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
14
Zone three's
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."
"presidential actions will be allowed only if the law enacted by Congress is
unconstitutional."14' 1 Justice Jackson determined that President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills fit into zone three because "Congress has not left
seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory
policies inconsistent with this seizure. "42
When viewing Trump v. Hawaii against the backdrop of Justice
Jackson's zone one, it reinforces the Court's conclusion that President
Trump was within the scope of his presidential authority because he was
acting pursuant to an express authorization of Congress. The passage of the
INA resulted in the President's power being enhanced to its maximum
strength-the President possessed all of his authority as president, in
addition to all the power Congress delegated him.
After Congress passed the INA, it was within President Trump's power
to use the discretion Congress delegated to him to make findings of fact
related to immigration. President Trump empowered the administrative state
by using agencies as tools to accomplish his goal to suspend entry of foreign
nationals from certain countries. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and Trump
v. Hawaii serve as reminders that once Congress has explicitly delegated
power to the President, courts have very little power in reviewing
presidential acts that are in accord with Congress's delegation of power.
Without meaningful judicial review, the Executive Branch is relatively
unchecked and free to use the administrative state as the President sees fit.
This, however, is not the only way in which the Judicial Branch defers to

138. Id. at 635-37.
139. Id. at 637.

140. Id.
141. CHEMER1NSKY, supranote 134, at 355.
concurring).
142. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J.,
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Congress's delegation of its powers. The Judicial Branch also uses Chevron
deference to defer to administrative agencies' determinations.
B. Judiciary'sDeference to Administrative Agencies: Chevron
Although the plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii attacked the President's
actions not the agencies', courts reviewing agency determinations have little
power in overturning agency decisions due to the landmark decision of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 143 After
Chevron, the Judicial Branch defers to an agency's decision so long as that
agency decision is merely rational.'44
In Chevron, the Court created a new standard of judicial deference to
administrative agency decisions. In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air
Act because certain states failed to satisfy the national air-quality standards
established by the EPA in the Clean Air Act. 145 The amended Clean Air Act
"imposed strict permitting requirements on those who desired to build or to
modify a major stationary source of air pollution" in the noncompliant
states. 46
' The EPA adopted a rule that allowed "a State to adopt a plantwide
definition of the term stationary source." 147 The EPA's adoption of this rule
allowed "an existing plant that contain[ed] several pollution-emitting
devices [to] install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the
permit conditions if the alteration [did] not increase the total emissions from
the plant."' 148 Essentially, the EPA's rule allowed plants to circumvent the
permit process by allowing states "to treat all of the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased
49
within a single 'bubble.'"1
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
admitted that Congress had not explicitly defined what it intended
"stationary source" to mean.15 ° However, the court determined that the
purpose of the program was to improve air quality and that the EPA's bubble
concept was contrary to that purpose.15 1 Therefore, the court set aside the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 839-40.
WERHAN, supra note 6, at 374.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 841-42.
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and refused to defer to the agency's definition of a
EPA regulations 152
stationary source.

The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit "chastising the lower
court... for over-reaching its review powers." 153 The Court stated that
"[t]he basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial
definition of the term 'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress
itself had not commanded that definition."' 5 4 The Court went on to create
the test that would become known as Chevron deference:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created ...program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

statute. 155
The Court ultimately redefined judicial review by creating a two-step
analysis. 56 First, a court must determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' 1 57 If so, the court must give effect
to Congress's expressed intent. 158 Second, if Congress is silent or ambiguous
on the issue, the court will determine whether the agency's interpretation "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." 159 The agency's
interpretation must merely be reasonable.16 0
152. Id. at 842.
153. WERHAN, supra note 6, at

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

375.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 842-44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
See id.
Id.at 842.
See id
Id. at 843.
Id. at845.
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Chevron deference has ultimately given broad power to an agency's
interpretation of legislation. At the same time, it has minimized courts'
ability to impose its own judgment in face of an agency's reasonable
interpretation. 161 Chevron has been criticized as reversing the traditional
scope of review doctrine and making agencies, rather than courts, the
authoritative interpreter of ambiguous provisions in the statutes they
administer.' 6 2 It is apparent through both Youngstown and Chevron that
courts have very little power to interject once Congress has delegated its
power to the President who then relies on that power to act.
This process culminates into a vicious cycle of Congress delegating its
power to the President, the President using that authority to empower the
administrative state, and the Judicial Branch deferring to both the acts of the
President and the decisions made by administrative agencies. This collusive
system is the opposite of the framers' intent. The national government
designed by the framers "ensured that the branches would regularly
clash."16' 3 This clashing was orchestrated to prevent tyranny and promote
liberty. 164
CONCLUSION

Considering Trump v. Hawaii and the Trade Expansion Act, Congress
continues to contribute to the growth and empowerment of the administrative
state. Congress does this by abdicating its legislative power to the President,
who then utilizes the administrative agencies as tools to do his bidding. The
discussion of Youngstown and Chevron illustrated the typical response the
Judicial Branch has to both acts of the President and the decisions made by
administrative agencies-deference. Unfortunately, the culmination of these
actions has emboldened the administrative state and enabled it to flourish.
This is contrary to the framers' design for our national government.
"The framers of the Constitution aimed to create a national government that
was energetic, but limited, effective, yet safe. Their goal, in short, was to
produce a balanced government."165 This balanced approach was fueled by
the framers' fear of tyrannical power, as seen in the English government and
fought against during the American Revolution.166
However, the
administrative state has disintegrated the lines delineating America's
161. See id
162. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005).
163. MICHAELS, supra note 2, at 7.
164. Id.
165. WERHAN, supra note 6.
166. Id.
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balanced government, and Congress has been at the front of the pack. By
vesting its power to enact rules into administrative agencies Congress has
caused the administrative state to grow.
The "vice of the modem administrative state is that Congress often
'punts' on the policy direction-proclaiming amorphous goals, such as
achieving 'clean air' or 'clean water'-and then gives administrative
167
'
As a
agencies virtually unchecked authority to 'fix' the problem."
consequence, "[a]gencies [have] become de facto lawmakers, determining
policy matters of national consequence." 6 8
Evidence of Congress's "punting" is found in statistics comparing the
relatively small number of laws Congress passed to the extraordinary number
of regulations administrative agencies promulgated. At the end of 2016,.
"Federal departments, agencies, and commissions issued 3,853
rules... while Congress passed and the president signed 214 bills into lawa ratio of 18 rules for every law."' 169 If the framers were to see the American
government as it is now, overrun by the administrative state, it is no doubt
that their minds would turn to Federalist No. 47: "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
or elective, may
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
170
tyranny."
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